individual, free from all constraint. However, Plato's claim is that in reality sophistry tends to remove the psychic from the political sphere. This is because, for the sophists, as for the historian Thucydides, we must split reality between nature or physis on the one hand, and nomos or law, on the other. Nature and culture have nothing to do with each other, because nature is inexorable and meaningless, inciting of blind passions, while culture, shaped by law, is entirely wilful, conventional and artificial.4 F 5 This ensures that individual expressions of soul in artifice are just conscious manifestations of a blind will to power, as it were vagaries of nature, rather than revelations of natural order. And in seeking power in the city they have to try to incite and manipulate all sorts of other blind and egotistic human passions. In this way, ironically, through the highest exercise of a refined and cynical artifice --that has today reached a new pitch in contemporary advertising and celebrity culture --they encourage the invasion of the civic realm of nomos by ever-greater manifestations of pre-human physis which we can never hope to command. One gets, precisely, 'the urban jungle'.
Plato's refusal of this picture is actually in harmony with the archaic wisdom of most human societies. For they do not generally divide nature from culture, but think of nature as itself including many animal cultures and of human culture as itself a natural manifestation. In Platonic terms this means that the realm of the psyche, though higher than the material, is still fully a part of nature. It is for this reason that he thinks that political life cannot be accounted for in terms of anything pre-political -for example, as we would now tend to think, anything evolutionary. As he puts it in
The Laws: 'habits, customs, will, calculation, right opinion, diligence and memory will be prior creations to material length, breadth, depth and strength, if (as is true) soul is prior to matter'.5 F 6 Notice here again the mix of public things like 'habit and custom' with private things like 'diligence and memory' as equally belonging to the psychic sphere.
It follows for Plato, as perhaps for most pre-modern human beings, that if human culture cannot be reduced to pre-human nature, and yet is itself fully in continuity with that nature, that it must be guided by a power and by standards higher than itself.
The sophists denied this, but thereby they effectively denied the integral reality of the human, since they split the psychic sphere between the invading ravages of egoistic 5 See Marshall Sahlins, The Western Illusion of Human Nature (Chicago: Prickly Paradigm, 2008) . 6 Plato, Laws, 896c-d.
nature on the one hand and the arbitrary contrivances of the human will on the other.
The latter, if guided by no given and natural but also higher power can inherently can know no bounds -a circumstance which must eventually encourage the creation of a post-human superman.
It then follows that there can be no art of politics, defined as an exercise of justice, irreducible to either natural necessity or an individual will to power, if the soul that rules itself or other souls is not guided by the transcendent reality of the true, good and beautiful. In practical terms this means that the just ruler does not merely ensure that the social realities of brute force and material need are kept in their spatial places by reason (for this risks reducing reason itself to a subtler kind of coercive power) but rather that he continuously tries to ensure through time and on differently arising occasions that these subordinate things and all different things are harmoniously and
proportionately blended in such a way as to participate in the transcendent kalon which is both goodness and beauty. To do this is to exercise intuitive and nontechnical phronesis, a capacity somewhat akin to the Daoist virtue of 'inaction' and one which of course Aristotle learnt the importance of -as of so much else --from his master Plato to whom he remained largely faithful. arbitrary, yet should reflect as far as possible non-arbitrary justice.
Now one crucial way to remind politics and politicians of this truth is to specifically identify a socially inward spiritual community to which politics is finally answerable. A community whose seeking of harmonious relationship with humans, 14 For example, Gorgias 489a-b: [addressing the young sophist Callicles]: 'Do the majority believe or do they not that equal shares, not unequal, are right, and that it is baser to do wrong than to suffer wrong?' Scorates then goes on to argue that this witness of the vox populi suggests that such beliefs are founded in physis and not just nomos. 15 Gorgias, 511a-513a. 16 One can add here that the modern assumption that individual conscience is a sort of locked box within which it is impossible to know to any degree 'how it is to be someone else' can be questioned.
For if the psychic is real as a 'spiritual space' then there is no reason why other minds should not enter my psychic space or rather why we should not meet in a shared psychic space wherein, indeed, gestures and words allows us to some degree to experience what it is to be the other. After all, we only experience even ourselves through the reflex experience of how we are registered by other things and people. There is a profound link here between what Charles Taylor has called the desired 'buffering' of the modern self from invasion by unseen spiritual forces with its buffering against invasion by other human spirits.
animals, plants, gods and God is in excess of either material need or coercive law.
Hence Plato already spoke of a city of the philosophers; in the case of Buddhist civilisations we have the phenomenon of the Sangha; in the case of Islam (so much at times philosophically influenced by Plato) of the Umma. Ancient Israel had her tribe of Levites and most dramatically, in the case of Christianity, one has the phenomenon of the Church. Most dramatically, because here the separation from the political state and yet the political centrality of the spiritual community was taken the furthest of all.
Here I think one can argue that while Confucius indeed grasped the universality of the ethical, he could not so far disentangle it from the customary as to arrive at the sense of the validity of individual rebellion, nor the need for a spiritual and higher 'politics within politics'. Meanwhile, the original Hindu impulse (later much modified, as we can see by the extraordinary ethical witness of Mahatma Gandhi)
amounted to a kind of higher spiritual sophistry in the name of an amoral monism, for which the individual soul achieves most power and most magical influence precisely by removing itself from the community and from normal earthly aims.
Perhaps I am gently suggesting here that Kathleen Raine's vision was more specifically western than she realised. In any case, there would seem to be something But that is not true of symbolically valuable objects, like your grandmother's ring, nor of relational goods whether enjoyed along with other people or other natural realities.
I can constantly find more, or more to treasure in a person or a beloved landscape.
And a non-liberal economy could realistically express, even through the various modes of exchange --through contract, price, salary, profit and interest --our often mutual appreciation of such things, since human disagreement is just not as absolute as metropolitan liberals like to fantasize.
However, if liberalism encourages an economy based on our boredom with shallow things, inciting us to want always more, then liberalism itself is of diminishing utility. At first it unleashed a thousand blossoms of creativity, but in the long term it undermines creative impulses to produce the genuinely valuable and it equally undermines the trust upon which all economic interventions and exchanges ultimately depend. We have recently seen all too well how an entirely amoral market is actually a dysfunctional market.
In the third place, liberalism has now swallowed its own early modern origins, as
Jean-Claude Michéa has argued.1 6 F 17 These had overwhelmingly to do with an abandonment of the politics of the soul. The process (as Michéa fails to mention) had begun well back into the Middle Ages but was certainly consummated in the 17 th C. It arose to a large degree because agreement in the transcendent good started to be associated with conflict and warfare. Yet in the face of an increasing exigency for peace at any price, Thomas Hobbes and others oddly assumed a hyperbolic violence, a war of all against all as the natural human condition. They did so in part because they thought (and unsurprisingly, after the all too many wars of religion) that disagreements regarding the nature of the Good were not subject to rational arbitration.
But this exposes to view a remarkable chiasmus. While Christianity believed that reality was originally and at heart peaceful, and only violent because of the irruption of sin, and yet in practice had often encouraged warfare, liberalism exactly reverses this. In the name of reducing conflict, liberalism nonetheless thought that reality was inherently agonistic and humans naturally egotistic and prone to conflict. processes are combined -human relationship is sidestepped, and we are mediated behind our backs by an act of instrumentalist and rationalistic manipulation. This is always carried out in the name of pure abstract 'growth' -ether in collective wealth or collective power.
Yet in the long run, if all human interaction is bypassed, we start to lose the skill for it. We trust only ourselves and no others, and certainly not the government. Nor does the government trust us: thus one gets the pursuit of private profits whose ease of gaining is to do with the fact that they merely transfer and do not grow real wealth; thus one also gets an increasing number of posh criminals who calculate that they can flout the social contract and get away with it; thus again one gets increasingly criminalised politicians who bleed the system for their own private interests. In this way liberalism more and more produces the war of all against all that was its own presupposition. But this does not thereby prove that presupposition, because it is only the practice of liberalism that has produced the circumstances which it originally merely assumed. For despite the many wars over truth -and are they not more noble than liberal wars over money? And less terrible than the wars that have been instigated by nihilists who have taken liberal logic to its limits? -human culture could never have arisen without practices of trust: of gratuitous gift, counter-giving and gratuitous giving again which anthropologists have long known forms the main bond of all human societies. In this sense 'society', as socialists and anarchists argued against the liberals, is indeed more fundamental than either law or contract, either politics or economics.
Therefore in all three ways we can see how liberalism is self-eaten by its own mean and sordid declarations, however well-intentioned. Thereby of course it has devoured itself in a fourth way that corresponds to its second, 18 th century phase of liberalism as political economy. Only liberalism is subject to its own fantasised government by the hidden hand, because only in the case of liberalism do private actions have no public intentionality upon which a wider public intention could be constructed that is in continuity with the first actions, even if they never envisaged this upshot --just as the shapers of the Anglo-Saxon moot never envisaged the modern Houses of Parliament. But where there can be no such continuity, as in the case of liberal principles applied to itself, then the hidden hand works to produce a yet worse chaos out of a perverse attempt to distil from chaos, order.
At the heart of these four self-swallowings lies the refusal of the reality of the soul and so of the political sphere as such, properly understood. For with liberalism, the realm of the psychic and of the psychopolitical is corroded from two opposite directions, echoing the sophistic division between physis and nomos. On the one hand everything human is declared only natural -we are a bunch of greedy apes with bigger brains. On the other hand, everything human is declared entirely artificial, just stuff that we have made up. And by the way this is true of 17 th C 'New Science' also -it was alternatively seen as the new and literal truth of nature, equivalent to the knowledge of God himself (eg by Galileo Galilei) and as 'merely' the pragmatic truth of technological control, telling us nothing about how deep nature 'really is' at all (eg by Marin Mersenne).1 8 F 19 In this way liberalism tends to make the human vanish in two directionsarchaically in the face of the tide of pre-human nature; and futuristically, as we can today see more clearly, in favour of a 'post-human' project that can hopefully subordinate human egotism and the unpredictabilities of desire to a cybernetic future that will augment the liberal 'peace of a sort' into an absolute but absolutely eerie biotechnical tranquillity.
Moreover, these two opposite directions by no means mystically coincide -except, perhaps, at the never-to-be-reached utopian point when experts would have willed away their own will in favour of a sheerly 'natural' cybernetic determinism. But before that point liberalism always imposes upon us entirely contradictory imperatives, which negatively reveal the unreality of trying to deny, abolish or ignore the soul.
Thus liberalism declares, as we have seen, that all is natural and yet all is artificial, because it cannot admit that we are 'supposed to be cultural', that nature most fully reveals herself in the human experience of love for nature, for other humans and for the divine. This duality further plays itself out in the contradictory demand that all sacrifice their liberty to the needs of growth and yet that the 'rights' of all to assert their negative liberty and material comfort against this need are equally absolute; in the view that we must submit to inexorable economic necessities, and yet that economic processes are the ultimate expression of human freedom; in the demand that we work all the time and yet equally relax and consume all the time; in the view that all our significant actions impinge on the freedom of others and so must mostly be criminalised and exposed to public ridicule in the name of 'transparency', while equally we enjoy a right of absolute privacy to do what we like so long as it is (supposedly) done 'only to ourselves'. This despite the fact that any damage we did truly to ourselves and our own soul, would render us the most dangerous of citizensas a recent example shows all too well. Whoever loses his own soul, cannot in fact gain even the world, because thereby he has helped to destroy the human world also.
These polarities tend further to coagulate in deeper ones of 'male versus female', 'natural environment versus human industry' and 'rational ego versus the unconscious'.1 9 F 20 In all three cases we have to endure the social and psychological damage of a seemingly unmediable tension which ruins our personal relationships, our integration of culture with nature and our ability to relate dreams and imaginings to our everyday public lives. Yet in all three cases also we fail to see that exaggeration in either direction (for example the simultaneous 'modernist' adulation of both pure public functionalism and purely subjective fantasy) is precluding the possibility of a harmonious balance of the sexes, powers and forces around an integration that must necessarily be psychic in kind.
Of course, we need sometimes to work and sometimes to play: to discern what is more physically or more spiritually caused; to expose some things and keeps other hidden; sometimes to put the community first and sometimes the individual; to criminalise some things and leave other wrongs to the force of shame and social disapproval. But the point is that, without the vision of the transcendently good, we have no 'prudential' or 'non-active' way to make these discernments, and
proportionately to distribute different 'rights', and so liberalism is involved in an increasingly hysterical shuttle between the various sets of poles which are always variants on the arch-poles of physis and nomos. Above all it tends to encourage the foolish view that anything not against the law is acceptable, while endlessly criminalising (as did New Labour) minor offences and utterances.
For this reason liberalism is now not just the enemy of politics, of high culture, folk culture and human flourishing, but also the enemy of freedom itself and of true civil liberties which are rooted in a discernment of justice, respect for the reality of the individual soul and of the superiority of the spiritual community, lying freely beyond the law and beyond economic calculation.
It is for these reasons that we must I think recover, in the wake of Kathleen Raine, the spirit of the archaic west. Yet this does not mean restoring unjustifiable hierachies and inequalities that liberalism rightly swept away. After all, Christianity had already democratised Platonism with its 'ultra-theurgic' message of a God who reached down to be born in a manger and with its more open yet more extreme mysteries of water, bread and wine. The higher wisdom had now become just that ordinary and yet unfathomable love or reciprocity known to all human cultures. If gifts could be bonds, then that was because they were sacred symbols. The problem indeed is that this tends to involve many different visions of the nature of 'goods' that are exchanged, which are only symbolically valued 'goods' because they participate in an eternal Good, which different cultures might perceive differently.
Therefore liberalism was not wrong to see a problem of conflict as arising from these competing visions, and a general secular gift-exchange, it might be argued, is but another illusory universalism (to rival that of liberal egoism). Yet the price paid by liberalism for the refusal of the politics of the soul remains too high -in venturing a drastic cure, it finally threatens to kill the human patient.
What can be suggested here instead is that Christianity has already universalised gift-exchange. Normally, the symbolic enclosures of gift-exchange have been gradually deserted in favour of abstract and relatively secularising structures of law and contract. But the ecclesia was conceived and enacted by Paul, perhaps in the wake of the Roman Stoic sage Seneca, as a cosmopolitan practice of reciprocity beyond law and contract. The goods exchanged here shared in, and were validated by a symbolic gift that was nothing other than one fully generous and sacrificial human being who was thereby deemed divine. In this way the aporia of intimate but exclusively symbolic gift versus universal but impersonal norm was resolved in terms of the universality of the yet more absolutely particular -as Hegel and more recently Alain Badiou have helped us to see. This particular has further proliferated through all the equally 'particular' style of the Christian legacy which has nonetheless shown a 'Catholic' capacity to be receptive to the multifarious insights of other human traditions.
But whether or not my reasoning in this instance seems acceptable, I do not see how we can sustain the genuine western legacy unless we revive, more democratically, its archaic idiom. This is required I think both to sustain the absolutely incomparable value of the person and of relational reciprocity in free association. We need both the mysticism of the individual soul and the spiritual and liturgical community of souls, in whatever sense. For our true human equality resides in the upper register of the shared psychic and not in the lower register of matter, which is the realm only of the unconscious and occultly striving or desiring, and so in neither case of the communal. Whenever equality has tried to speak in the name of our lowest shared attribute, a fantasised and grim purpose has been ideologically attributed to the innocent simplicity of matter -whether of racial preference, class preference or economic growth for the sake of it. The option of 'disenchanted immanence' has failed us dismally.
Instead, I have been advocating a more democratised version of 'enchanted transcendence' which sees all worldly realities, including cultural ones, as symbolising something higher and hidden. For this perspective respects both nature as beyond the human and yet the higher place of many degrees of flora and fauna, with humanity at the top, within that nature itself. Allowing that our psychic culture belongs to physis allows us also to develop a humanistic ecology that yet avoids a triumphalism about the human ability to control the natural world.
This perspective is also to be preferred to the 'disenchanted transcendence' of Jansenism and Unitarian Newtonianism that drove so much of the Enlightenmentwhere the creation does not symbolise an arbitrary God, but is rather his plaything.
Fallen human beings are then encouraged like their maker to dominate nature, even though they cannot be trusted to relate to each other but must rather bend to this deity's providential cunning that distils a simulacrum of the political out of psychic disorder.
But enchanted transcendence is furthermore to be preferred to the enchanted immanence or pantheism of the pre-romantic Goethe and other 'radical enlightenment' Spinozists, or more recently of Heidegger. For while this perspective allows us to wonder at the irreducible enigma of nature (and rightly argues that we can better understand the 'causes' of the natural world by religiously or poetically contemplating its upshots than by dissecting its mechanisms) it denies the reality of personal forces behind nature and so the sanctity of our own interpersonal life.
Katheleen Raine was so much more perceptive than most university academics in realising that fully-fledged early romantics like Blake, Shelley, Wordsworth and
